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Abstract
In this paper, we propose two authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, SMEN and
SMEN−, which have efficient online computation and tight security proof in the extended
Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. SMEN takes 1.25 exponentiations in online computation, close
to that (1.17 exponentiations) of the most efficient AKEs MQV and its variants HMQV and
CMQV. SMEN has a security reduction as tight as that of NAXOS, which is the first AKE hav-
ing a tight security reduction in the eCK model. As a comparison, MQV does not have a security
proof; both HMQV and CMQV have a highly non-tight security reduction, and HMQV needs a
non-standard assumption; NAXOS takes 2.17 exponentiations in online computation; NETS, a
NAXOS variant, takes two online exponentiations in online computation. SMEN simultaneously
achieves online efficiency and a tight security proof at a cost of 0.17 more exponentiations in
offline computation and the restriction that one party is not allowed to establish a key with
itself. SMEN− takes 1.29 exponentiations in online computation, but SMEN− does not use the
static private key to compute the ephemeral public key (as does in SMEN, NAXOS, CMQV,
and NETS), and hence reduces the risk of leaking the static private key.
1 Introduction
An authenticated key establishment (AKE) protocol enables two parties to establish a shared key
with the property that, when one party computes a key, it is ensured that only the intended party
can compute the same key. Most AKE protocols are extension of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol [5]. Typically, such an AKE works on a cyclic group G with a generater g. A party Aˆ has a
static public/private key pair (A, a) where A = ga. Another party Bˆ has a static public/private key
pair (B, b) where B = gb. Aˆ computes an ephemeral public/private key pair (X,x) where X = gx,
and sends X to Bˆ. Bˆ computes an ephemeral public/private key pair (Y, y) where Y = gy, and
sends Y to Aˆ. Aˆ and Bˆ compute a shared key based on their private keys and the peer’s public
keys.
1
Several attacks and security properties for AKE protocols have been identified in the litera-
ture, e.g., known-key security (KKS), perfect forward secrecy (PFS),1 key compromise imperson-
ation (KCI), unknown key share (UKS), leak of ephemeral key (LEP) (see [8] and [6] for detailed
description of the attacks). Several AKE security models have been proposed to capture these
attacks. Typical early work includes the BR model by Bellare and Rogaway [2], and the CK model
by Canetti and Krawzcyk [3]. Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented an extended
Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model [7], which captures all above attacks within a single model.
Both security and efficiency are important to AKE protocols. Efficiency is evaluated by using
the number of exponentiation operations used by one party to establish a key.2 MQV [8] and
its variants HMQV [6] and CMQV [15] are among the most efficient AKE protocols, which take
only 2.17 exponentiation operations for one party to establish a key. However, MQV does not
have a security proof based on some commonly used assumptions. HMQV has a very complicated
security proof in the CK model (plus some security properties not captured by the CK model). The
proof is based on the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [13] and the knowledge-of-exponent
assumption (KEA) [4]. CMQV has a relatively simple security proof in the eCK model based
on GDH assumption. Both proofs are in the random oracle (RO) model [1]. Both proofs use
the Forking Lemma of Pointcheval and Stern [14], which introduces a constant not worked out in
HMQV or CMQV and results in non-tight security reduction [15].
The NAXOS AKE protocol [7] has a tight security proof based on GDH in the eCK model.
In NAXOS, both the static private key and the ephemeral private key are used to compute an
ephemeral public key. This trick prevents an adversary from obtaining the discrete log of the
ephemeral public key unless both the static private key and the ephemeral private key are leaked.
However, NAXOS is not very efficient. It takes 3.17 exponentiations for one party to establish
a session key. NETS [9] is a variant of NAXOS that takes three exponentiations to establish a
session key. It has been an open problem to find an AKE that achieves the performance of MQV
and enjoys a security reduction as tight as that of NAXOS. A potential disadvantage of using the
NAXOS trick is that this may increase the risk of leaking the static private key, since the key is
used twice as much as in an AKE without using the NAXOS trick.
Online Efficiency. The computation in an AKE protocol can be divided into two parts: offline
computation and online computation. Offline computation can be done any time before one party
starts to engage in a key exchange process with any other party. Online computation takes place
when one party starts to compute the shared key with a specific peer after they have exchanged
ephemeral public keys. Online efficiency is more important than offline efficiency since it is “real
time”. In previous studies, performance of an AKE protocol is evaluated by using the total number
of exponentiations in key establishment. The reason of doing so may be that all previous AKE
protocols have the same offline computation overhead, and hence the total efficiency represents
the online efficiency. When offline computation overheads are different for different protocols, it is
reasonable to use online efficiency, instead of the overall efficiency, as the first criteria to evaluate
the computational performance.
1As indicated in [6], any two-pass AKE can only achieve weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS). The PFS considered
in this paper is actually wPFS.
2We assume that, in the protocols, 1) it is not necessary to check if xq = 1 to verify whether x is an element
of a group G of order q, 2) efficient algorithms are used to compute the product of multiple exponentiations (e.g.,
g1
x1g2
x2) and multiple exponentiations using the same base (e.g., gx, gy). See Section 2.2 for these algorithms).
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Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose two AKEs named SMEN (Secure MQV or Efficient
NAXOS) and SMEN−. SMEN takes 1.25 exponentiations in online computation and 1.17 exponen-
tiations in offline computation. It is secure in the eCK model and enjoys the same simplicity and
tightness in security proof as NAXOS. SMEN− takes 1.29 exponentiations in online computation.
SMEN− may provide better security against static private key leakage, and it may be the first
efficient AKE secure in the eCK model without using the NAXOS trick. Table 1 compares the
above AKE protocols in efficiency and security.
Protocol Efficiency Security Assumption Proof NAXOS
Offline Online trick
MQV 1 1.17 KKS, wPFS, KCI, UKS ? ? No
HMQV 1 1.17 CK, wPFS, KCI, LEP ROM, GDH, KEA not tight No
CMQV 1 1.17 eCK ROM, GDH not tight Yes
NAXOS 1 2.17 eCK ROM, GDH tight Yes
NETS 1 2 eCK ROM, GDH tight Yes
SMEN− 1.17 1.29 eCK ROM, GDH tight No
SMEN 1.17 1.25 eCK ROM, GDH tight Yes
Table 1: Efficiency (in number of exponentiations) and security comparison.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
eCK model and other preliminary background. In Section 3, we present the SMEN protocol, its
performance analysis, and its security proof. In Section 4, we present the SMEN− protocol, its
performance analysis, and its security proof. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Extended Canetti-Krawczyk Model
The extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model is described as an experiment between an adversary
Mˆ and a challenger Cˆ. A certificate authority ĈA is involved in registering public keys. Initially,
Mˆ selects the identities of n honest parties, for whom Cˆ generates static private key/public key
pairs and registers the public keys to ĈA.
Execution of an AKE by one of these parties is called an AKE session. A session identifier sid
is defined as
sid = (role, Aˆ, Bˆ, comm),
where role = {I,R} is the role (initiator/responder) of the owner of the session, Aˆ is the identity
of the owner, Bˆ is the identity of the other party in the session, and comm is the concatenation
of communication messages between the two parties. Two sessions sid = (role, Aˆ, Bˆ, comm1) and
sid∗ = (role, Bˆ, Aˆ, comm2) are matching sessions if role is the complement of role and comm1 =
comm2 . A protocol execution between Aˆ and Bˆ without the intervention of an adversary produces
two matching sessions.
In the experiment, Mˆ controls all communications between the parties, and can reveal the static
private key of a party, the ephemeral private key in a session, and the session key of a session. Mˆ
can make any sequence of the following queries, which Cˆ needs to answer accordingly:
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• Send(Aˆ, Bˆ, comm). Mˆ sends a message comm to Aˆ on behalf of Bˆ. Cˆ returns Aˆ’s response.
• StaticKeyReveal(Aˆ). Cˆ returns the static private key of Aˆ.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(sid). Cˆ returns the ephemeral private key of the session sid.
• SessionKeyReveal(sid). Cˆ returns the session key of the session sid.
• Establish(Aˆ). Using this query, the adversary registers an arbitrary public key on behalf of
an adversary controlled party Aˆ. Cˆ only checks the validity of the public key, but does not
need to check the possession of the corresponding private key.
A session sid(role, Aˆ, Bˆ, comm) is fresh if the following conditions hold:
• Both Aˆ and Bˆ are honest parties.
• Mˆ did not query the session key of sid or its matching session sid∗ (if the matching session
exists).
• Mˆ did not query both the static private key of Aˆ and the ephemeral private key of Aˆ in this
session.
• If sid∗ exists, then Mˆ did not query both the static private key of Bˆ and the ephemeral
private key of Bˆ in this session.
• If sid∗ does not exist, then Mˆ did not query the static private key of Bˆ .
Security of an AKE is defined as follows. In an eCK experiment, Mˆ issues Send, StaticKeyReveal,
EphemeralKeyReveal, SessionKeyReveal, and Establish queries polynomial times (in a security param-
eter λ) in any sequence. Then Mˆ selects a completed session sid, and makes a query Test(sid). To
answer Test(sid), Cˆ chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. If b = 1, then Cˆ sets the session
key of sid as K. Otherwise, Cˆ selects K from the key space uniformly at random. Cˆ then returns
K as the answer of Test(sid). Mˆ continues to query Send, StaticKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal,
SessionKeyReveal, and Establish polynomial times. At last, Mˆ outputs a bit b′ and terminates the
game. If the selected test session is fresh and b′ = b, then Mˆ wins the game.
The advantage of the adversary Mˆ in the eCK experiment with AKE protocol Π is defined as
AdvAKEΠ (Mˆ) = Pr[Mˆ wins]−
1
2
.
An AKE protocol is secure (in the eCK model) if no efficient adversary Mˆ has more than a negligible
advantage in winning the above experiment, i.e.,
AdvAKEΠ (Mˆ) < 1/Q(λ)
for any polynomial Q() when λ is sufficiently large.
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Assumptions. Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order q. Let λ = log2 q be the security
parameter. Let x ∈R S indicate choosing x uniformly at random from set S. The following problems
and assumptions are defined on G.
• Discrete log problem (DLP): given X ∈R G, find x. We use DLG(·) to denote the function
that solves DLP.
• Computation Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: given X ∈R G, Y ∈R G, find gxy where gx =
X, gy = Y . We use CDH(·, ·) to denote the function that solves CDH.
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: distinguish (gx, gy, gz) from (gx, gy, gxy) where
x ∈R Zq, y ∈R Zq, z ∈R Zq. We use DDH(·, ·, ·) to denote the function that solves DDH.
DDH(X,Y, Z) outputs 1 if Z = CDH(X,Y ). Otherwise, DDH(X,Y, Z) outputs 0.
• Gap Diffie-Hellman problem (GDH): given an DDH oracle which solves the DDH problem,
solve the CDH problem.
The DL/CDH/DDH/GDH assumption says that the probability that any polynomial time (in λ)
algorithm can solve the DLP/CDH/DDH/GDH problem is negligible (in λ).
2.2 Efficient Exponentiation Algorithms
Single Exponentiation. To compute a single gx, a popular algorithm is the square-and-multiply
algorithm [11, §14.6.1]. Suppose that the bit length of x is t and the cost of a square operation is
the same as a multiplication. Then the algorithm on average takes 1.5t multiplication to compute
gx.
Multiplication of Exponentiations. To compute the product of k exponentiations
g0
e0 . . . gk−1ek−1 , the simultaneous multiple exponentiation [11, Algorithm 14.88] can be used to
reduce the computation. For k = 2, it takes 74 t + 2 multiplications, for k = 3, it takes
15
8 t + 6
multiplications, and for k = 4, it takes 3116 t+12 multiplications. Approximately, it can be estimated
that the product of two exponentiations takes 1.17 times a single exponentiation, product of three
exponentiations takes 1.25 times a single exponentiation, and product of four exponentiations takes
1.29 times a single exponentiation.
The algorithm requires additional storage. It stores 2k − 1 − k more group elements than
computing k separate exponentiations. For small k = 2, 3, 4, the overhead is trivial for most
applications.
Exponentiations Using the Same Base. To compute two exponentiations gx and gy using
the same base, the exponent combination algorithm [12] can be used. This algorithm takes about
1.17 times the cost of a single exponentiation to compute gx and gy simultaneously.
3 SMEN AKE Protocol
3.1 Description
In the protocol description, λ is the security parameter. G is a cyclic group of prime order q where
log2 q ≈ λ. h1 : Zq × Zq → Zq and h2 : G×G→ {0, 1}λ are two hash functions. Aˆ and Bˆ are two
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parties with static private/public key pairs (a,A = ga) and (b, B = gb) respectively. We assume
that the public key certificate of a party can be obtained after knowing its identity. The two-pass
SMEN protocol is as follows:
Offline phase
1. Aˆ selects two ephemeral private keys x˜1 ∈R Zq, x˜2 ∈R Zq, and computes
x1 = h1(x˜1, a), X1 = gx1 , x2 = h1(x˜2, a), X2 = gx2 .
Aˆ stores x˜1, x˜2, X1, X2, and erases x1, x2.
2. Bˆ selects two ephemeral private keys y˜1 ∈R Zq, y˜2 ∈R Zq, and computes
y1 = h1(y˜1, b), Y1 = gy1 , y2 = h1(y˜2, b), Y2 = gy2 .
Bˆ stores y˜1, y˜2, Y1, Y2, and erases y1, y2.
Online phase
1. Aˆ initializes a session s=(I, Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, ⊥) and sends (Bˆ, Aˆ,X1, X2) to Bˆ.
2. Upon receiving (Bˆ, Aˆ, X1, X2), Bˆ performs the steps:
(a) if Aˆ = Bˆ, then rejects and stops.
(b) verifies that X1 ∈ G,X2 ∈ G.
(c) computes y1 = h1(y˜1, b), y2 = h1(y˜2, b).
(d) computes the session key
K = h2(Ay1X1bX2y2 , Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
(e) erases y˜1, y˜2, y1, y2.
(f) completes a session s=(R, Bˆ, Aˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2), and sends (Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2) to Aˆ.
3. Upon receiving (Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Aˆ performs the following steps:
(a) if Bˆ = Aˆ, then rejects and stops.
(b) verifies that a session s =(I, Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, ⊥) exists.
(c) verifies that Y1 ∈ G, Y2 ∈ G.
(d) computes x1 = h1(x˜1, a), x2 = h1(x˜2, a).
(e) computes the session key
K = h2(Bx1Y1aY2x2 , Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
(f) erases x˜1, x˜2, x1, x2.
(g) completes the session s =(I, Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
It is straightforward to verify that, without the intervention of an adversary, Aˆ and Bˆ complete
with identical shared session keys and matching sessions.
6
3.2 Efficiency
In the online phase, each party needs to compute a product of three exponentiations. Using the
simultaneous multiple exponentiation algorithm, the cost is about 1.25 exponentiations on average.
As a comparison, MQV, HMQV, and CMQV compute a product of two exponentiations in online
phase, which takes 1.17 exponentiation.
In the offline phase, each party computes two exponentiations using the same base g. Using the
exponent combination algorithm, the cost is 1.17 exponentiations, only 0.17 exponentiation more
than that of MQV, HMQV, or CMQV.
3.3 Security
Theorem 3.1. SMEN is secure in the eCK model if h1() and h2() are modelled as independent
random oracles and if the GDH assumption holds.
Let gdh be the probability that any polynomial time algorithm solves the GDH problem, and let
dl be the probability that any polynomial time algorithm solves the DL problem. For any adversary
that involves at most n honest parties and activates at most k sessions, we have that
AdvAKESMEN (Mˆ) ≤ max{k2, nk}(gdh + dl).
Proof. Define
f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)
= CDH(A, Y1)CDH(B,X1)CDH(X2, Y2).
Let E indicates a true eCK experiment, let M be the event that Mˆ wins an eCK experiment,
and let H be the event that Mˆ queried h2(f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) where sid =
(∗, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) is the test session. Let H¯ be the event that H does not happen. It holds
that
AdvAKESMEN (Mˆ) = Pr[M |E]− 1/2
= Pr[M ∧H|E] + Pr[M ∧ H¯|E]− 1/2.
First we consider the event M ∧ H¯. Let σ be a 7-tuple
σ = (f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
A session key is computed as K = h2(σ). In the protocol, only matching sessions have identical
7-tuples. In the eCK model, Mˆ is not allowed to reveal the session keys of the test session or
its matching session. Since h2() is modelled as a random oracle, without querying h2(σ) where σ
is identical to the 7-tuple of the test session, Mˆ does not obtain any information about the test
session key. It holds that
Pr[M ∧ H¯|E] = 1/2
and
AdvAKESMEN (Mˆ) = Pr[M ∧H|E] (1)
≤ Pr[H|E].
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Algorithm 1: SessionKey(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)
if (⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈ T2 then
return h
else if (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈ T2 where α = f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) then
return h
else
add (⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) to T2 where h ∈R {0, 1}λ
return h
Next we consider the eventH. There are two cases that Mˆ chooses a test session: a test session with
a matching session (denoted as event L) and a test session without a matching session (denoted as
event L¯).
L. The test session has a matching session.
In this case, we modify the experiment E to E′ as follows. In E′, Cˆ selects at random a session
sidA owned by an honest party Aˆ and a session sidB owned by an honest party. Cˆ runs E′
the same way as it runs E, except that Cˆ aborts E′ if sidA and sidB become non-matching
as the experiment proceeds, or sidA is not chosen by Mˆ as the test session in the experiment.
Let T be the event that Cˆ does not abort E′, i.e., sidA is the test session and sidB is its
matching session. It holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L] = Pr[H|E′ ∧ T ] (2)
=
Pr[H ∧ T |E′]
Pr[T |E′]
≤ k2 Pr[H|E′]
We then modify the experiment E′ to experiment S in which Cˆ simulates the hash functions
h1() and h2(). In S, Cˆ maintains a hash table T2. T2 contains tuples (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h)
where h is supposed to be the hash value
h = h2(α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
T2 is initially empty. We define two algorithms, SessionKey() in Algorithm 1 and Hash() in
Algorithm 2, to maintain T2.
Let (X,Y ) be the input of a CDH challenge. We modify E′ to S as follows.
• For sidA, Cˆ chooses (x˜1, x˜2) and computes X1 as defined in the protocol, but sets
X2 = X, and computes the session key
K = SessionKey(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
If a tuple (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) already exists in T2, then SessionKey() needs to check
if α = f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since a = DLG(A) and x1 = DLG(X1) are known,
SessionKey() can check if this relation holds by using the DDH oracle to check if
DDH(X2, Y2, α/(Bx1Y1a)) = 1.
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Algorithm 2: Hash(α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)
if (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈ T2 then
return h;
else if there is a tuple (⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) ∈ T2 and α = f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) then
update the tuple to (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h)
return h
else
add (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) to T2 where h ∈R {0, 1}λ.
return h
• For sidB, Cˆ chooses (y˜1, y˜2) and computes Y1 as defined in the protocol, but sets Y2 = Y ,
and computes the session key
K = SessionKey(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
If a tuple (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) already exists in T2, then SessionKey() needs to check
if α = f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since b = DLG(B) and y1 = DLG(Y1) are known,
SessionKey() can check if this relation holds by using the DDH oracle to check if
DDH(X2, Y2, α/(Ay1X1b)) = 1.
• For any other sessions, Cˆ proceeds according to the protocol faithfully.
• Cˆ answers the hash query h2(α, Iˆ, Rˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) by replying with
Hash(α, Iˆ, Rˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
When the query is h2(α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), if a tuple ((⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h)) is al-
ready in T2, Hash() needs to check if α = f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since each (⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈
T2 is added by SessionKey() where Cˆ knows either (a, x1) or (b, y1), Hash() is able to
check if the relation holds.
• Cˆ simulates h1() in the usual way. When queried with h1(x), if h1(x) has not been
queried, then Cˆ returns a random value; otherwise, Cˆ returns the same value as it
returned for h1(x) before.
• Cˆ answers the StaticKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, SessionKeyReveal, and Establish
queries faithfully.
The difference between the probabilities that H happens in E′ and S is upper bounded by
the probability that Mˆ successfully distinguishes the two experiments. Let D be the output
of a distinguisher for the two experiments. It holds that
|Pr[H|E′]− Pr[H|S]| ≤ |Pr[D = 1|E′]− Pr[D = 1|S]|.
We consider the probability that Mˆ distinguishes S from E′. The difference between E′ and
S is due to the fact that Cˆ does not know DLG(X2) or DLG(Y2) where X2 = X,Y2 = Y .
However, the session keys involving X2 or Y2 are computed by using SessionKey() or Hash(),
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and SessionKey() and Hash() give consistent results. Since sidA is the test session, Mˆ is not
allowed to reveal both a and (x˜1, x˜2), or both b and (y˜1, y˜2). Suppose that Mˆ is able to
distinguish E′ from S. Then Mˆ must be able to distinguish at least one of the following four
pairs of distributions:
(a) (X,A, a) and (gh1(a,x˜2), A, a) (corresponding to the case that Mˆ reveals a),
(b) (X,A, x˜2) and (gh1(a,x˜2), A, x˜2) (corresponding to the case that Mˆ reveals x˜2),
(c) (Y,B, b) and (gh1(b,y˜2), B, b), (corresponding to the case that Mˆ reveals b),
(d) (Y,B, y˜2) and (gh1(b,y˜2), A, y˜2) (corresponding to the case that Mˆ reveals y˜2 ).
Since h1 is a random oracle, (X,A, a) and (gh1(a,x˜2), A, a) are indistinguishable. If Mˆ is able
to distinguish (X,A, x˜2) from (gh1(a,x˜2), A, x˜2), then, in the random oracle model, it can be
shown that Mˆ must have queried h1(a, x˜2), therefore, he must have computed a = DLG(A).
Similarly, (Y,B, b) and (gh1(b,y˜2), B, b) are indistinguishable, and if Mˆ is able to distinguish
(Y,B, y˜2) from (gh1(b,y˜2), B, y˜2), then Mˆ must have computed b = DLG(B). We conclude that
the if Mˆ is able to distinguish E′ and S, then Mˆ is able to solve the DLP. It holds that∣∣Pr[D = 1|E′]− Pr[D = 1|S]∣∣ ≤ dl.
Therefore,
Pr[H|E′] ≤ Pr[H|S] + dl (3)
If H happens in S, then the inputs to h2(f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) are
recorded in T2. Since Cˆ knows (a, x1), Cˆ can find the record by using the DDH oracle to
check if
DDH(X2, Y2, α/(Bx1Y1a)) = 1,
and then find
CDH(X,Y ) = CDH(X2, Y2) = α/(Bx1Y1a).
In this case, Cˆ solves a CDH problem using a DDH oracle. It holds that
Pr[H|S] ≤ gdh. (4)
Combining (2), (3), and (4), it holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L] ≤ k2(gdh + dl). (5)
L¯. The test session does not have a matching session.
In this case, we modify E to E′ as follows. Cˆ randomly chooses an honest party Bˆ and a
session sidA owned by an honest party Aˆ. Cˆ runs E′ the same way as it runs E, except that
Cˆ aborts E′ if the peer in sidA is not Bˆ, or sidA is not chosen as the test session in the
experiment. Let T be the event Cˆ does not abort E′, i.e., sidA is the test session and the
peer in this session is B. It holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L¯] = Pr[H|E′ ∧ T ] (6)
=
Pr[H ∧ T |E′]
Pr[T |E′]
≤ knPr[H|E′]
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We then modify the experiment E′ to experiment S as follows. Without loss of generality,
we assume that Aˆ is the initiator in the session sidA.
• For Bˆ, Cˆ sets B = Y . In a session sidB = (R, Bˆ, Oˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) owned by Bˆ where B
is a responder, Cˆ picks (y˜1, y˜2) as the ephemeral private keys, chooses y1 ∈R Zq, y2 ∈R Zq,
and computes Y1 = gy1 , Y2 = gy2 . Cˆ computes the session key as
K = SessionKey(Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
If a tuple (α, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) already exists in T2, then SessionKey() needs to check
if α = f(Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since y1 and y2 are known, SessionKey() can check if the
relation holds by using the DDH oracle to check if
DDH(B,X1, α/(Oy1X2y2) = 1
where O is the static public key of the peer Oˆ.
In a session sidB = (I, Bˆ, Oˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) owned by Bˆ where B is an initiator, the
simulation is similar and we omit the detailed steps.
• For sidA = (I, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Cˆ generates (x˜1, x˜2) and computes X2 according to
the protocol, but sets X1 = X. Cˆ computes the session key as
K = SessionKey(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
If a tuple (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) already exists in T2, then SessionKey() needs to check
if α = f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since a = DLG(A) and x2 = DLG(X2) are known,
SessionKey() can check if the relation holds by using the DDH oracle to check if
DDH(X1, B, α/(Y1aY2x2)) = 1.
• For any other sessions, Cˆ proceeds according to the protocol faithfully.
• Cˆ answers the hash query h2(α, Iˆ, Rˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) by replying with
Hash(α, Iˆ, Rˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
When the query is h2(α, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), if a tuple ((⊥, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h)) al-
ready exists in T2, Hash() needs to check if α = f(Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). When the query
is h2(α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), if a tuple ((⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h)) already exists in T2,
Hash() needs to check if α = f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since each (⊥, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈
T2 or (⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈ T2 is added by SessionKey(), Cˆ knows either (y1, y2)
or (a, x2) respectively. Therefore, Hash() is able to check if the relation holds.
• Cˆ simulates h1() in a usual way.
• Cˆ answers the StaticKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, SessionKeyReveal, and Establish
queries faithfully.
We consider the probability that Mˆ distinguishes S from E′. The difference between the
probabilities that H happens in the two experiments is upper bounded by the probability
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that Mˆ successfully distinguishes the two experiments. Let D be output of a distinguisher
for the two experiments. It holds that
|Pr[H|E′]− Pr[H|S]| ≤ |Pr[D = 1|E′]− Pr[D = 1|S]|.
The difference between E′ and S is due to the fact that Cˆ does not know DLG(B) or DLG(X1)
where X1 = X,B = Y . However, the session keys involving B or X1 are computed by calling
SessionKey() or by calling Hash(), and SessionKey() and Hash() give consistent results. Since
sidA is the test session, Mˆ is not allowed to reveal both a and (x˜1, x˜2), or to reveal DLG(B).
In this case, the only way that Mˆ can distinguish S from E′ is if Mˆ queries h1(a, x˜1), h1(b, y˜1),
or h1(b, y˜2) to find out that X2, Y1, or Y2 was not computed correctly. However, Mˆ cannot
do this unless it computes DLG(X1) or DLG(B) (A more detailed analysis would be similar
to the analysis for distinguishing E′ and S under the event L). It holds that
|Pr[D = 1|E′]− Pr[D = 1|S]| ≤ dl.
Therefore,
Pr[H|E′] ≤ Pr[H|S] + dl (7)
If H happens in S, then the inputs of the hash query
h2(f(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)), Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)
are recorded in T2. Since Cˆ knows (a, x2) for sidA, Cˆ can find the record by checking if
DDH(X1, B, α/(Y1aY2x2)) = 1,
and then find
CDH(X,Y ) = CDH(X1, B) = α/(Y1aY2x2)).
In this case, Cˆ solves a CDH problem using a DDH oracle. Then it holds that
Pr[H|S] ≤ gdh. (8)
Combining (6), (7), and (8), it holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L¯] ≤ kn(gdh + dl). (9)
Combining (1), (5), and (9), we have that
AdvAKESMEN (Mˆ) ≤ Pr[H|E]
= Pr[H|E ∧ L] Pr[L] + Pr[H|E ∧ L¯] Pr[L¯]
≤ max{Pr[H|E ∧ L],Pr[H|E ∧ L¯]}
= max{k2, kn}(gdh + dl).
If the GDH assumption and the DL assumption hold, then gdh and dl are negligible in the security
parameter λ. Both k and n are polynomial in λ. Therefore, AdvAKESMEN (Mˆ) is negligible.
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3.4 Reflection Attacks
SMEN does not allow a party to establish a key with itself. This is necessary to prevent Mˆ from
distinguishing S from E′ under the event L¯ (the test session does not have a matching session).
Recall that under the event L¯, in experiment S, Bˆ’s public key B is replaced with Y . If Aˆ = Bˆ,
then Mˆ would find out that A 6= Y and deduce that it is in S. From another point of view, if
SMEN allows a party to establish a key with itself, then the protocol suffers from the following
reflection attack where Mˆ impersonates Aˆ to Aˆ : Mˆ receives (Aˆ, Aˆ,X1, X2) from Aˆ , chooses
y2, computes Y1 = 1/X1, Y2 = gy2 , and sends back (Aˆ, Aˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). The session key is
K = h2(gx2y2 , Aˆ, Aˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), and Mˆ can compute it using y2.
We note that, although NAXOS and NETS allow a party to establish a key with itself, their
security proofs do not cover this case. In the proofs, when the adversary chooses a test session
(role, Aˆ, Bˆ, ∗) without a matching session, the simulator changes a true experiment to a simulated
experiment by substituting the public key of the peer Bˆ with V , where V is part of the input
of a CDH challenge. The proofs are based on the argument that the two experiments are indis-
tinguishable to the adversary. However, this argument holds only when Aˆ 6= Bˆ. When Bˆ = Aˆ,
the adversary can find out it is in a simulated experiment because V 6= A where A is Aˆ’s public
key. This flaw can be fixed by adding a case to the proof. When Mˆ chooses (role, Aˆ, Aˆ, ∗) as a
test session, the simulator change the experiment as follows: Cˆ randomly chooses a party Aˆ , and
substitutes its public key with V . Mˆ chooses r ∈R Zq and computes X = Ar, and sets the session
key as K ∈R {0, 1}λ. If Mˆ does not choose a session (role, Aˆ, Aˆ, ∗) without a matching session as
the test session, then Cˆ aborts. It can be shown that if Mˆ wins the experiment, then in the random
oracle model, Cˆ can compute gv
2
. If Cˆ can compute gv
2
for given gv, then it can solve the CDH
problem [10].
4 SMEN− AKE Protocol
SMEN uses the NAXOS’ trick to compute an ephemeral public key so that an adversary cannot
get its discrete log in the eCK model. This trick needs to use the static private key to compute
the ephemeral public key. If we want to minimize the risk of leaking the static private key, then
we may try to minimize the use of the static private key. At the same time, we do not want to
sacrifice the efficiency or tightness of reduction too much. To achieve this property, we propose
SMEN−, which does not use the NAXOS trick, but is still efficient in online computation and tight
in security reduction.
4.1 Description
In the protocol description, λ is the security parameter. G is a cyclic group of prime order q
where log2 q ≈ λ. h : G × G → {0, 1}λ is a hash function. Aˆ and Bˆ are two parties with
static public key/private key pairs ((A1, A2), (a1, a2)) and ((B1, B2), (b1, b2)) respectively, where
A1 = ga1 , A2 = ga2 , B1 = gb1 , B2 = gb2 . We assume that the public key certificate of a party can
be obtained after knowing its identity. The two-pass SMEN− protocol is as follows:
Offline phase
1. Aˆ selects x1 ∈R Zq, x2 ∈R Zq, computes X1 = gx1 , X2 = gx2 , and stores x1, x2, X1, X2.
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2. Bˆ selects y1 ∈R Zq, y2 ∈R Zq, computes Y1 = gy1 , Y2 = gy2 , and stores y1, y2, Y1, Y2.
Online phase
1. Aˆ initializes a session s=(I, Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, ⊥) and sends (Bˆ, Aˆ,X1, X2) to Bˆ.
2. Upon receiving (Bˆ, Aˆ, X1, X2), Bˆ performs the steps:
(a) if Aˆ = Bˆ, then Bˆ rejects and stops.
(b) verifies that X1 ∈ G and X2 ∈ G.
(c) computes the session key K = h(A1y1X1b1A2b2X2y2 , Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
(d) sends (Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2) to Aˆ.
(e) completes session s=(R, Bˆ, Aˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
3. Upon receiving (Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Aˆ performs the following steps:
(a) if Aˆ = Bˆ, then Aˆ rejects and stops.
(b) verifies that a session s =(I, Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, ⊥) exists.
(c) verifies that Y1 ∈ G and Y2 ∈ G.
(d) computes the session key K = h(B1x1Y1a1B2a2Y2x2 , Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
(e) completes session s =(I, Aˆ, Bˆ, X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
It is straightforward to verify that, without the intervention of an adversary, Aˆ and Bˆ complete
with identical shared session keys and matching sessions.
4.2 Efficiency
In the online phase, each party needs to compute a product of four exponentiations. Using the
simultaneous multiple exponentiation algorithm, the cost is about 1.29 exponentiations on average.
4.3 Security
Theorem 4.1. SMEN− is secure in the eCK model if the hash function h() is modelled as a random
oracle and if the GDH assumption holds.
Let gdh be the probability that any polynomial time algorithm solves the GDH problem. For any
adversary that involves at most n honest parties and activates at most k sessions, we have that
AdvAKESMEN−(Mˆ) ≤ max{k2, nk}gdh.
Proof. Define
f2(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)
= CDH(A1, Y1)CDH(B1, X1)CDH(A2, B2)CDH(X2, Y2).
Let E indicates a true eCK experiment, let M be the event that Mˆ wins an eCK experiment,
and let H be the event that Mˆ queried h(f2(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) where sid =
(∗, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) is the test session. As with SMEN, it holds that
AdvAKESMEN−(Mˆ) ≤ Pr[H|E]. (10)
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In the eCK model, Mˆ is not allowed to reveal both the static private key and the ephemeral private
key of a test session. If the test session has a matching session, then Mˆ is not allowed to reveal
both the static private key and the ephemeral private key of the matching session, either. If the
test session does not have a matching session, then Mˆ is not allowed to reveal the static private
key of the peer in the session. There are six cases that Mˆ chooses a test session. We denote them
as L1, . . . , L6, and describe the simulation and analysis for each case as follows. Let (X,Y ) be the
input of a CDH challenge.
L1. The test session does not have a matching session, and Mˆ does not reveal the ephemeral
private key of the owner of the test session.
In this case, we modify E to E′ as follows. Cˆ chooses an honest party Bˆ and a session sidA
owned by an honest party Aˆ at random. Cˆ runs E′ the same way as it runs E, except that
Cˆ aborts E′ if the peer in sidA is not Bˆ, or sidA is not chosen as the test session in the
experiment. Let T be the event Cˆ does not abort E′. It holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L¯] = Pr[H|E′ ∧ T ] (11)
=
Pr[H ∧ T |E′]
Pr[T |E′]
≤ knPr[H|E′]
We then modify the experiment E′ to experiment S. In S, Cˆ simulates h() the same way
as Cˆ simulates h2() in SMEN, except that the function f() in SMEN is substituted with
f2(). Without loss of generality, we assume that Aˆ is an initiator in a session in which it
participates, and Bˆ is a responder in a session in which it participates.
• For Bˆ, Cˆ sets B1 = Y . In a session sidB = (R, Bˆ, Oˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) owned by Bˆ, Cˆ
picks (y˜1, y˜2) as the ephemeral private keys, chooses y1 ∈R Zq, y2 ∈R Zq, and computes
Y1 = gy1 , Y2 = gy2 . Cˆ computes the session key as
K = SessionKey(Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
If a tuple (α, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) is already in T2, then SessionKey() needs to check if
α = f2(Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since b2, y1 and y2 are known, SessionKey() can check if
the relation holds by using the DDH oracle to check if
DDH(B1, X1, α/(O1y1O2b2X2y2) = 1
where (O1, O2) is the public static key of the peer Oˆ.
• For sidA = (I, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), Cˆ generates (x˜1, x˜2) and computes X2 according to
the protocol, but sets X1 = X. Cˆ computes the session key as
K = SessionKey(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
If a tuple (α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) already exists in T2, then SessionKey() needs to check
if α = f2(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2). Since a1, a2 and x2 are known, SessionKey() can check if
the relation holds by using the DDH oracle to check if
DDH(X1, B1, α/(Y1a1B2a2Y2x2)) = 1.
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• For any other sessions, Cˆ proceeds according to the protocol faithfully.
• Cˆ answers the hash query h2(α, Iˆ, Rˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2) by replying with
Hash(α, Iˆ, Rˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
When the query is h2(α, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), if a tuple ((⊥, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h)) al-
ready exists in T2, Hash() needs to check if
α = f2(Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
When the query is h2(α, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2), if a tuple ((⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h)) al-
ready exists in T2, then Hash() needs to check if
α = f2(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2).
Since each (⊥, Oˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈ T2 or (⊥, Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, h) ∈ T2 is added
by SessionKey(), Cˆ knows either (b2, y1, y2) or (a1, a2, x2) respectively. Therefore, Hash()
is able to check if the relation holds.
• Cˆ simulates h1() in a usual way.
• Cˆ answers the StaticKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, SessionKeyReveal, and Establish
queries faithfully.
The difference between E′ and S is due to the fact that Cˆ does not know DLG(B1) or DLG(X1)
where X1 = X,B1 = Y . However, the session keys involving B1 or X1 are computed by
SessionKey() or by Hash(), and SessionKey() and Hash() give consistent results. In event L1,
since Mˆ does not reveal the ephemeral private key of Aˆ or static private key of Bˆ, E′ and S
are identical to Mˆ . Therefore,
Pr[H|E′] = Pr[H|S]. (12)
If H happens in S, then the inputs of the hash query
h2(f2(Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)), Aˆ, Bˆ,X1, X2, Y1, Y2)
is recorded in T2. Since Cˆ knows (a1, a2, x2) for sidA, Cˆ can find the record by checking if
DDH(X1, B1, α/(Y1a1B2a2Y2x2)) = 1,
and then find
CDH(X,Y ) = CDH(X1, B1) = α/(Y1a1B2a2Y2x2)).
In this case, Cˆ solves a CDH problem using a DDH oracle. Then it holds that
Pr[H|S] ≤ gdh. (13)
Combining (11), (12), and (13), it holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L1] ≤ kngdh.
For the following cases, we only describe the simulation and the analysis result. It is straight-
forward to work out the details following the same approach in L1.
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L2 Mˆ chooses a test session without a matching session, Mˆ does not reveal the static private
key of the session owner.
Change E to E′: Cˆ chooses a session sidA at random. Let Aˆ be the owner of sidA. Cˆ chooses
a party Bˆ at random. Cˆ stops if the peer in sidA is not Bˆ, or sidA is not the test session. It
holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L2] = nkPr[H|E′].
Change E′ to S: Cˆ sets A2 = X, B2 = Y .
We have that
Pr[H|E ∧ L2] ≤ nkgdh.
L3. Mˆ chooses a test session with a matching session. Mˆ does not reveal the static private key
of the session owner. Mˆ does not reveal the static private key of the matching session owner.
Change E to E′: Cˆ chooses a session sidA at random. Let Aˆ be the owner of the session. Cˆ
chooses another party Bˆ at random. Cˆ stops if sidA is not the test session or the other party
in sidA is not Bˆ . It holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L3] = nkPr[H|E′].
Change E′ to S: Cˆ sets A2 = X, B2 = Y .
We have that
Pr[H|E ∧ L3] ≤ nkgdh.
L4. Mˆ chooses a test session with a matching session. Mˆ does not reveal the ephemeral private
key of the session owner. Mˆ does not reveal the static private key of the matching session
owner.
Change E to E′: Cˆ chooses a session sidA at random. Let Aˆ be the owner of sidA. Cˆ chooses
another party Bˆ at random. Cˆ stops if the peer in sidA is not Bˆ, or sidA is not the test
session. It holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L4] = nkPr[H|E′].
Change E′ to S: Cˆ sets X1 = X, B1 = Y .
We have that
Pr[H|E ∧ L4] ≤ nkgdh.
L5. Mˆ chooses a test session with a matching session. Mˆ does not reveal the static private key
of the session owner. Mˆ does not reveal the ephemeral private key of the matching session
owner.
Change E to E′: Cˆ chooses a party Aˆ at random and chooses a session sidB at random. Let
Bˆ be the owner of sidB. Cˆ stops if the matching session of sidB is not the test session, or
the the peer in sidB is not Aˆ. It holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L5] = nkPr[H|E′].
Change E′ to S: Cˆ sets A1 = X, Y1 = Y .
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We have that
Pr[H|E ∧ L5] ≤ nkgdh.
L6. Mˆ chooses a test session with a matching session. Mˆ does not reveal the ephemeral private
key of the session owner. Mˆ does not reveal the ephemeral private key of the matching session
owner.
Change E to E′: Cˆ chooses a session sidA at random. Let Aˆ be the owner of sidA. Cˆ chooses
a session sidB at random. Let Bˆ be the owner of sidB. Cˆ stops if sidA and sidB are not
matching or sidA is not the test session. It holds that
Pr[H|E ∧ L6] = k2 Pr[H|E′].
Change E′ to S: Cˆ sets X2 = X, Y2 = Y .
We have that
Pr[H|E ∧ L6] ≤ k2gdh.
Summarizing the above results, it holds that
AdvAKESMEN−(Mˆ) ≤ Pr[H|E]
=
6∑
i=1
Pr[H|E ∧ Li] Pr[Li]
≤ max{Pr[H|E ∧ Li], 1 ≤ i ≤ 6}
= max{k2, kn}gdh.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed two AKE protocols that have efficient online computation and tight
security proofs in the eCK model. Previous AKEs provide either efficient computation (e.g., MQV,
HMQV, CMQV), or tight security proof (e.g., NAXOS, NETS), but not both. As an example,
CMQV uses 2.17 exponentiations in computation, but does not have a tight security proof. NETS
has a tight security proof, but it takes three exponentiations in computation. We focused on
improving the efficiency of online computation instead of the total computation, because online
computation is “realtime” and its efficiency is more important. We prosed an AKE named SMEN
whose online computation takes 1.25 exponentiations, close to that (1.17 exponentiations) of MQV,
HMQV, and CMQV. The security reduction of SMEN is as tight as that of NAXOS in the eCK
model. The NAXOS trick is used in the design of SMEN. We also proposed SMEN−, which does
not use the NAXOS trick. SMEN− takes 1.29 exponentiations in online computation. Without
the NAXOS trick, SMEN− may be more resilient to static private key leakage. Both SMEN and
SMEN− achieve efficient online computation and tight security reduction at the cost of one more
exponentiation in offline computation and a longer message, and the limitation that one party is
not allowed to establish a key with itself.
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